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STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law in its 
conclusion that delivery of $150,000 for final payment of a 
prior investment can constitute consideration for a unrelated 
Promissory Note. 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in 
its conclusion that Electro Technical Corporation's conversion 
of a $100,000 loan into an investment did not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction of that obligation. 
3. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in 
its conclusion that Defendants did not agree to pay Plaintiffs 
$500,000 for the purchase of a 40% interest in Mingo 13-13 oil 
well. 
4. Whether the Court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Defendant W. David Hammons was not personally 
liable under the investment Agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about October 27, 1982, Gregory G. Skoradas, Esq. 
filed the Complaint in the instant ca$e as Attorney for 
Plaintiffs Michael Strand, Lois Strand and Mingo Oil Company. 
On or about November 23, 1982, Defendant W. David Hammons filed 
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his answer to Plaintiffs1 Complaint. On or about December 27, 
1982, Defendant Estate of Herb Hammons (deceased) filed its 
answer. On or about November 23, 1982, Defendant Electro 
Technical Corporation filed its answer and counterclaim in which 
it sought to collect $350,000 from Mingo Oil Company and Mike 
Strand. 
On May 18, 1983, the Court entered Summary Judgment 
against Counterclaim Defendants. On September 16, 1983, the 
Trial Court granted Counterclaim Defendants relief from that 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
because it found that W. David Hammons had submitted a false and 
fraudulent Affidavit in support of the Counterclaim Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The matter came on for trial before the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings on July 30, 1986. Following presentation of 
Plaintiffs' case the Trial Court dismissed all actions against 
the Defendants and proceeded to hear the Counterclaim 
Plaintifffs case. Following trial on the Counterclaim the Court 
entered judgments against the Counterclaim Defendants. 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants filed Notice of Appeal 
from the Judgment on September 19, 1986. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 1, 1981, Plaintiff Michael Strand 
and Defendant Herb Hammons began discussing Defendants1 
participation in the drilling of an oil well on the Overland 
Dome Oil Field, Carbon County Wyoming. Following some initial 
conversations, Plaintiff Strand offered to sell to Defendants a 
5% interest in the well for $100,000.00. (Transcript p. 106, 
lines 10-11). At the time of these negotiations, Mr. Strand 
needed $100,000 for payment of an expense relating to the 
drilling of the well. On December 1, 1981, Herb Hammons loaned 
$100,000 to Mike Strand and received from him a hand written 
Promissory Note evidencing that debt. (Exhibit 1-D). The note 
called for repayment of the $100,000 on December 10, 1981 and 
was given so that Defendants would have additional time to 
decide if they wanted to make an investment in the well. 
According to the testimony of David Hammons, the 
Defendants made their decision to invest in the well sometime 
around the middle of December, 1981. At that time they agreed 
to acquire 40% of the well by paying $250,000 in cash and giving 
Mingo Oil Company a promissory note for an additional $250,000. 
(Transcript, p. Ill, lines 19-25). As part of this decision, 
the Defendants converted the initial obligation of $100,000 
which was evidenced by the first Promissory Note into the 
investment and decided to invest an additional $150,000 in 
cash. (Transcript, p. 149-150, lines 23-8). 
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Following their acceptance of Plaintiffs1 offer to sell 
40% of the Well for $500,000, the Defendants delivered the 
remaining $150,000 investment to Mike Strand. At the time of 
that delivery, Mingo Oil Company gave Defendant Electro 
Technical Corporation a Promissory Note for $250,000 which was 
guaranteed by M & L Investments. (Exhibit 2-D). The Plaintiffs 
alleged that this second Promissory Note evidenced a renewal of 
the initial $100,000 obligation and an additional $150,000 
debt. (Transcript, p. 13, lines 5-9). However at trial, 
Defendants contested Plaintiffs1 position and Defendant David 
Hammons testified that; (1) the $250,000 note had nothing to do 
with the original obligation; (Transcript, p. 107-108, lines 
22-6); (2) the original obligation was converted to an 
investment (Transcript, p. 133, lines 11-16); and (3) the 
decision to invest the additional $150,000 was made prior to the 
receipt of the second Promissory Note. (Transcript, p. 134, 
lines 17-21). In fact, Defendant Hammons testified that the 
Promissory Notes stood on their own. (Transcript, p. 108, line 
24) . 
After the payment of the monies and conversion of the 
prior obligation, the Parties instructed counsel to draw up the 
legal documents memorializing the agreement and Defendant 
Electro Technical Corporation took advantage of the tax credit 
created by the $500,000 investment. (Transcript, p. 77, lines 
3-8). Before the formal documents were signed, Defendant David 
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Hammons and Plaintiff Mike Strand executed an informal statement 
which memorialized their Agreement. (Exhibit P-12). Formal 
Agreements and a Promissory Note in the amouftt of $250,000 were 
never executed by the Defendants because of the death of Herb 
Hammons and the initiation of an unrelated Chapter 11 proceeding 
which stopped all activities on the Overland Dome Oil Field, 
including completion of the oil well in question. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First Argument: Lack of Consideration: The Second 
Promissory Note (Exhibit 2-D) is unenforceable for lack of 
consideration. Counterclaim Plaintiff delivered $150,000.00 
Mingo Oil Company on December 30, 1981 as payment for its 
investment in Mingo 13-13 Oil Well pursuant to a prior agreement 
between the parties. At the time the mon^y was delivered Mingo 
Oil Company executed the note in question. Counterclaim 
Plaintiff's prior contractual obligation to pay the money means 
that the delivery of the $150,000 can not constitute 
consideration for the execution of the Promissory Note. General 
Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasjty, Corp. 545 P.2d 
502 (Utah, 1976). 
Second Argument: Accord and Satisfaction: The 
Counterclaim Plaintiff admitted that the original obligation was 
converted into an investment pursuant to ah Agreement between 
the parties. This subsequent Agreement cabling for a different 
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performance discharged the original obligation and constituted 
an Accord and Satisfaction as a matter of law. 
Third Argument: Accord and Satisfaction: The Trial 
Court's finding that testimony presented at trial did not 
establish the existence of an Accord and Satisfaction is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Fourth Argument: Substantial Evidence: The Trial 
Court's finding that there was no meeting of the minds regarding 
the Defendants obligation to pay Plaintiffs $250,000 is not 
supported by substantive evidence. 
Fifth Argument: Substantial Evidence: The Trial Court 
finding that there was no evidence submitted that the Defendants 
were personally obligated to Plaintiffs is clearly erroneous and 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
FIRST ARGUMENT 
THE SECOND PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE AMOUNT OF $250,000 
IS UNENFORCEABLE DUE TO LACK OF CONSIDERATION 
In support of its Counterclaim, Electro Technical 
Corporation presented the testimony of David Hammons (hereinafter 
Hammons). Hammons testified on direct examination that 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs did pay at least $250,000.00 to Mingo 
Oil Company. (Transcript p. 145, lines 10-13). Based on this 
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testimony and the testimony Hammons presented during the 
Plaintiffs1 case, the trial court fouhd that Counterclaim 
Plaintiff gave $150,000 to Counterclaim Defendants and concluded 
as a matter of law that the delivery of gaid money constituted 
valid consideration for the issuance of the Promissory Note by 
Mingo Oil Producers the repayment of which was guaranteed by M & 
L Investments. 
The Court's finding of fact, to wit}, that Counterclaim 
Plaintiff gave $150,000 to or for the benefit of Mingo Oil 
Company, is not contested by Appellants. However, the 
associated conclusion of law that the giving of this money 
constituted valid consideration for the Promissory Note is 
clearly erroneous and must be reversed on appeal. 
A Promissory Note is not in and of itself a debt but 
rather is merely evidence of indebtedness between the maker and 
the payee. See Pierpont v. Hydro Manufacturing, Company, Inc., 
22 Ariz. App. 252, 526 P.2d 776, 778 (1974). For a Promissory 
Note to be legally enforceable, it mu^t be supported by 
consideration. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Promissory Nbtes such as the ones 
in question in the present case which are not negotiable 
instruments carry no presumption that thfey were issued for a 
valuable consideration. See First Investment Co. v. Anderson, 
621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980). Therefore, consideration for the 
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issuance of the second note by Mingo Oil Company must be 
established by the Counterclaim Plaintiff as part of its prima 
facia case. See General Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1976). No evidence was 
presented at trial to support the conclusion that any 
indebtedness existed between Mingo Oil Company and the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff at the time the $250,000 note was 
executed. In fact, Hammons, who was the sole witness called by 
the Counterclaim Plaintiff, testified that no money was loaned 
to Mingo Oil Company in December of 1981. (Transcript, p. 150, 
lines 19-23). 
In direct contradiction to the court's conclusion that 
some indebtedness existed between Mingo Oil Company and the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, Hammons testified that he negotiated an 
agreement whereby Counterclaim Plaintiff agreed to pay $250,000 
and issue a Promissory Note for $250,000 as consideration for 
the acquisition of a 40% interest in an oil well which was being 
drilled by Mingo Oil Company. (Transcript p. 123, lines 3-25). 
And, Hammons testified that this was the only agreement entered 
into between Mingo Oil Company and the Counterclaim Plaintiff. 
(Transcript, p. 124, lines 4-5). 
Hammons testified that the Counterclaim Plaintiff made 
its decision to invest the money with Mingo Oil Producers prior 
to the execution of said Promissory Note (Transcript p. 134, 
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lines 17-21), and made a partial payment of $100,000 toward the 
investment on or about December 18, 1981, when the decision was 
made. (Transcript p. 149-150, lines 23-5). Finally, Hammons 
testified that for the total investment of $500,000 the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff did receive a 40% interest in the oil 
well in question. 
In the face of this evidence, the trial court concluded 
as a matter of law that the delivery of the $150,000 to Mingo 
Oil Producers, which was made in payment for Counterclaim 
Plaintiff's investment, constituted consideration for the 
Promissory Note in question. That conclusion is contrary to 
applicable law and must be reversed on Appeal. 
The evidence is undisputed that Counterclaim Plaintiff 
decided sometime during the middle of December, 1981, to make an 
investment with Mingo Oil Producers. (Transcript, p. 105, lines 
20-23) . 
An Hammons explained: 
Q. And who — you invested the money with Mingo Oil 
Company. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And the investment decision was made prior to the 
Promissory Note. 
A. Which Promissory Note? 
Q. To the second Promissory Note. 
A. Yes, to the $250,000.00 Promissory Note. 
(Transcript, p. 134, lines 14-21). 
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The law is settled in this jurisdiction and all other 
jurisdictions that an agreement to do that which a party is 
already required to do by law or by contract does not constitute 
consideration for a new promise. See Baggs v. Anderson, 528 
P.2d 141, 142 (Utah 1974); Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256, 260 
(N.M. 1980); Carroccia v. Todd, 615 P.2d 225, 228 (Mont. 1980). 
It is equally well settled that where consideration is lacking 
there is no contract. See General Insurance Co. of America v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp. 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). 
In the present case, the Counterclaim Plaintiff was 
required by a contract which it had entered into on or about 
December 18, 1981, to pay to Mingo Oil Producers the total cash 
amount of $250,000. (Transcript, P. 133, lines 19-20). Partial 
payment under that Agreement was effectuated during the middle 
of December. (Transcript, P. 131, lines 23-25). On or about 
December 30, 1981, Counterclaim Plaintiff paid the additional 
amount of $150,000 to Mingo Oil Company. At the time it made 
the payment, it received a Promissory Note from Mingo Oil 
Company in the face amount of $250,000. Because the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff was obligated by prior contract to make 
that payment, the delivery of the $150,000 can not as a matter 
of law constitute consideration for the promissory note in 
question. 
AAJM/ms 
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This case is factually similar to the case of General 
Insurance Co, of America v. Carnicero Dynasty, Corp, 545 P.2d 
502 (Utah 1976). In that case, an indemnity agreement was 
signed after an original agreement was entered into by the 
parties. The facts in General Insurance indicated that an 
agreement was entered into between the parties under which the 
Plaintiff became legally bound to make certain payments prior to 
the time the payments were actually made and related indemnity 
agreements were signed. Based on those facts, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the indemnity agreements under which plaintiffs 
sought recovery were lacking in consideration and therefore were 
not enforceable contracts. Id. 545 P.2d 505j. 
Similarly in the present case, the Promissory Note 
signed on December 30, 1981, and the accompanying guarantee of 
the indebtedness represented thereby is not enforceable. The 
testimony of the Counterclaim Plaintiff's only witness is clear 
and unequivocal. The Counterclaim Plaintiff made a decision to 
invest the money in question with Mingo Oil Company prior to the 
execution of the second Promissory Note, (Transcript p. 134, 
lines 14-21), and the Counterclaim Plaintiff did not pay any 
money or other consideration to Mingo Oil Company in the form of 
a loan or debt during December 1981. (Transcript, p. 150, lines 
15-23). 
AAJM/ms 
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Under these facts, the Trial Courts conclusion of law 
that the investment of $150,000 based on a decision made during 
the middle of December and partially performed constitutes 
consideration for the Promissory Note in question is clearly 
erroneous and must be reversed on Appeal.1 
SECOND ARGUMENT 
THE CONVERSION OF THE INITIAL LOAN INTO 
AN INVESTMENT CONSTITUTES AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
At the trial, Counterclaim Defendant contended that the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff's decision to convert the initial loan 
into an investment in the oil well constituted an accord and 
satisfaction of the indebtedness. Following the trial the Court 
found that "there was no accord and satisfaction on said note." 
(Judgment p. 3; Transcript of Judge's Ruling, p. 3, lines 
2 0-22). This ruling evidences a misunderstanding of the law 
involving accord and satisfaction and a misapplication of the 
facts under that law. 
An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a 
contract enter into a new agreement offered in substitution for 
the original contract which calls for a different performance 
that will discharge the original obligation. See Bennion v. 
!ln its oral ruling the Court announced that the 
Counterclaim Plaintiff could not recover pre-judgment interest 
on the $250,000 Promissory Note. However, in the final written 
judgment pre-judgment interest was awarded. This contradiction 
represents, in essence, a clerical mistake that this Court can 
remedy summarily upon Appeal. 
AAJM/ms 
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LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah, 1985). 
An accord and satisfaction need not be in writing. See Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985). 
To establish an accord and satisfaction, the party 
claiming its existence must prove the following elements: (1) a 
proper subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3) assent or 
meeting of the minds; and (4) a consideration given for the 
accord. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 
(Utah 1980). All of' these elements were established in the 
present case by the Counterclaim Defendants in relation to the 
$100,000 Promissory Note. 
There is no question that Counterclaim Defendant Strand 
received $100,000 and issued the first Promissory Note as 
evidence of that obligation. (Transcript p. 106-107, lines 
23-2). At the Trial, Hammons testified that this initial 
obligation or loan was converted to an investment in the Mingo 
13-13 well. (Transcript p. 131, lines 18-25; p. 133, lines 
8-16; p. 149-150 lines 23-1). 
The testimony presented at trial revealed the purchase 
by the Counterclaim Plaintiff of a 40% interest in Mingo 13-13 
oil well. The exact terms of that agreement were that 
Counterclaim Plaintiff would pay $250,000 cash and promise to 
pay an additional $250,000 to acquire the 40% interest. 
13 
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(Transcript p. 123-124, lines 1-1). A portion of the $250,000 
cash was the conversion of the prior $100,000 obligation into 
the investment. (Transcript p. 133, lines 8-20; p. 149-150, 
lines 23-14). 
As Mr. Hammons testimony clearly establishes: 
Q. (By Mr. Jackson): So you are now saying there is 
no agreement between you and Mr. Strand and your brother and Mr. 
Strand that the monies you contributed on December 1, of 1981 
would be converted to an investment in the Well? 
A. No, I think that it was converted to an investment. 
Q. There was an Agreement that it would be converted; 
is that Correct. 
A. That is correct. 
(Transcript p. 131, lines 18-25). 
During the trial the evidence established and Hammons 
admitted that the Counterclaim Plaintiff did in fact receive a 
40% interest in the deep test well, Mingo 13-13, pursuant to the 
Agreement between the parties. (Transcript, p. 13 4, lines 
2-4). It is very interesting that Hammons testified that one of 
the reasons the investment was made was to take advantage of 
certain tax shelters that would be created by the investment. 
Mr. Hammons openly admitted that if the Counterclaim Plaintiff 
had lent the money, rather than investing it, it would have been 
unable to obtain the advantages of those tax advantages. 
(Transcript, p. 114, lines 14-18). The Counterclaim Plaintiff's 
intent and the essence of the Agreement to convert the prior 
loan was explained by Hammons when he stated: 
14 
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A. We were getting additional information on the oil 
field. When it became obvious, or obvious to us, that we 
weren't going to be repaid by the terms of this note on the 
10th, and that the middle of the month came and went and he 
(Strand) still didn't have any money, we found out that the 
security he had given us on this Hundred-Thousand Dollars was 
already encumbered more than the value of the security, we 
weighed the possibilities of putting additional money in rather 
than walking away from this or trying to seek the return. 
Q. Did you reach some decision about this? 
A. Yes, we did, some further analysis and working with 
Mr. Wisan and having conversations with him and repeated 
conversations with Mr. Strand and his staff, which includes a 
geologist that was on the staff with him, and the private 
independent or so-called independent information that he had in 
his office regarding the field we decided maybe we could
 A go 
ahead and try to make the best out of a bad situation and invest 
the other money and plus get the tax credit. 
(Transcript p. 104-105, lines 24-16) (Emphasis Added). 
This decision by the Counterclaim Plaintiff to convert 
the prior loan into an investment in the oil well constitutes a 
substitute agreement calling for a different performance in 
discharge of the prior obligation, and therefore, an accord and 
satisfaction. See Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson, Const. Co., 701 
P.2d 1072 (Utah, 1985). Simply stated, there was an offer to 
sell the Counterclaim Plaintiff a 40% interest in the oil well 
for $250,000 plus a promissory note in that amount. There was 
an acceptance of that offer and a conversion of the prior loan 
into the investment, and the Counterclaim Plaintiff received the 
40% interest for which it had bargained. An accord and 
satisfaction was entered into by the parties and the original 
obligation evidenced by the $100,000 Promissory Note should have 
AAJM/ms 
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been discharged. The Trial Court's conclusion to the contrary 
constitutes reversible error. 
THIRD ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT NO ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION WAS ENTERED INTO IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Although the Trial Court did not render formal findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, in ruling from the bench, it 
stated: 
The Defendants on the Counterclaim, Mr. Strand and 
Mingo Oil, claim that there was subsequently an accord 
and satisfaction in that the Plaintiff, Electro 
Technical Corporation, though its officers, the Hammons 
brothers, agreed that this note would be cancelled and 
that the $100,000.00 would become an equitable 
investment in the Mingo Oil 13-13 partnership. 
Based upon the testimony the Court is not 
persuaded that there was an accord and satisfaction. . . 
(Transcript of Courts ruling, p. 3, lines 13-21). 
There is absolutely no evidentary support for the 
Court's finding that the $100,000 did not become an equitable 
investments Again and again in his testimony, Hammons 
reiterated the fact that the original loan of $100,000 was 
converted to an investment. Therefore, that portion of the 
Trial Court's decision is clearly erroneous and not supported by 
substantive evidence. 
AAJM/ms 
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The direct testimony of Hammons establishes that the 
initial loan was in fact converted to an investment. As he 
explained: 
Q. (By Mr. Jackson): So are you now saying there is 
no agreement between you and Mr. Strand and your brother and Mr. 
Strand that the monies that you contributed on December 1, or 
1981 would be converted to an investment in the well? 
A. No, I think that it was converted to an investment. 
Q. There was an Agreement that it would be converted; 
is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(Transcript p. 131, lines 18-25) . 
Mr. Hammons also testified th&t one of their 
motivations at the time the loan was converted to an investment 
was the tax shelter that could be created by the investment. 
(Transcript p. 114, lines 5-13). During t|ie trial, Mr. Hammons 
testified that he and his brother understood that if the money 
had been loaned to Mr. Strand no tax shelter would have been 
created. (Transcript, p. 114, lines 14-18). Yet in the face of 
this unrebutted testimony the trial court was not persuaded that 
the initial loan of $100,000 was converted into an investment. 
Previously, in this brief, Appellant pointed out that 
an accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract 
agree that a certain performance offered in substitution of the 
performance originally agreed upon will discharge the obligation 
created under the original agreement. See Petersen v. Petersen, 
17 
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709 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah, 1985). While this Court must look at 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings, in a case such as the present where the Counterclaim 
Plaintiff called a single witness, this court can not ignore the 
admissions of that witness and the inferences which flow 
naturally therefrom and blindly uphold the decision of the trial 
court. 
The Counterclaim Plaintiff's only witness Hammons 
testified that he and his brother made a voluntary and conscious 
decision to accept Mingo Oil Company's offer to convert their 
initial loan and make an additional $150,000 as an investment in 
Mingo 13-13 oil well. He admitted that the loan was in fact 
converted to an investment and further admitted that one of the 
reasons for the conversion was the tax shelter created thereby. 
He testified that if the loan was not converted to an equity 
investment no tax shelter would have been created. And, he 
testified that the conversion was made pursuant to an agreement 
with Mingo Oil Company. Those direct admissions establish all 
the elements of an enforceable accord and satisfaction. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT 
AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT EXISTED 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES REGARDING THE DEFENDANT'S 
AGREEMENT TO PAY PLAINTIFF'S $500,000 
Following the presentation of the Plaintiffs' case, the 
Trial Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based upon 
AAJM/ms 
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its conclusion that there was no meeting of the minds as between 
Defendant Electro Technical Corporation in and the Plaintiffs to 
a note or an Agreement by Defendants to pay Plaintiffs the sum 
of $250,000. During its ruling, the Court admitted that it was 
confused by the evidence and "distressed because she believes 
that whatever the intentions of the parties were it is 
impossible for this Court, on the basis of the record, to 
determine. (Transcript of Trial, p. 143, lines 3-9). 
Appellants respectfully disagree with this observation. The 
testimony presented at the trial clearly established that the 
parties entered into an agreement under the terms of which, 
Defendants would pay $500,000 for an interest in Mingo 13-13 oil 
well. It is equally clear from the record that the Agreement 
called for a $250,000 cash payment and the execution of a 
Promissory Note in the amount of $250,000. 
The evidence on that issue could not have been 
clearer. Mr. Hammons testified that: 
A. "We had agreed to a Promissory Note to be executed 
for a like amount, $250,000.00, and that would be paid from the 
proceeds of the well. 
* * * 
Q. And you agreed to execute a Promissory Note for 
$250,000; is that correct? 
A. That was the Agreement, yes, it was. 
(Transcript, p. 123-124, lines 24-1; 6-9). 
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This Agreement was in fact memorialized by a written 
document signed by both parties (Exhibit P-12). At no time 
during the trial, did Hammons deny that the parties had reached 
an agreement regarding the investment of $500,000 in the form of 
$250,000 cash and a $250,000 promissory note.2 However, 
notwithstanding the direct admissions of the Defendants, the 
trial court found that there was no Agreement as to the 
$250,000. The fact that the Defendants agreed to execute a 
promissory note in the amount of $250,000 was not even an issue 
in the trial. (Pre-Trial Order). The only question before the 
Trial Court was whether or not the Defendants1 obligation under 
this oral agreement to pay the additional $250,000 was 
conditioned upon the receipt of proceeds from production of the 
well in question. As Mr. Hammons testified. 
A. We had agreed a Promissory Note to be executed for 
a like amount, $250,000.00, and that would be paid from the 
proceeds of the well. 
(Transcript p. 123-124, lines 24-1). 
Based on their agreement to execute a Promissory Note 
in the amount of $250,000, the Defendants took a total tax write 
off of $500,000. The only issue to be resolved by the trial 
court was whether the payments of the obligation from the 
2The law is established in Utah that if a written 
agreement is intended to memorialize an oral agreement, a 
subsequent failure to execute the written document does not 
nullify the oral contract. Lawrence Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 
642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah, 1982). 
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proceeds of the well was a condition precedent to Defendants' 
obligation to pay the $250,000 or simply a term included for the 
convenience of the parties. The Trial Court failed to address 
this issue and overlooked the direct admissions of the 
Defendants in concluding there was no agreement. This 
constitutes reversible error and requires the case be remanded 
for a new trial on this issue. 
FIFTH ARGUMENT 
DAVID HAMMONS IS PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE 
$250,000 INVESTMENT 
Following the Plaintiffs case, the Trial Court 
dismissed the Plaintiffs action against W. David Hammons 
individually based on its observation that: 
"Court does not believe there is any evidence in the 
record at this point that either Mr. David Hammons or 
his deceased brother Mr. Herb Hammons, individually 
obligated themselves on any of the claims set forth by 
the Plaintiff. (Transcript of Trial, p. 139 lines 
14-20). 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 12 was admitted into evidence 
at the trial. That document which was signed by the Defendant 
David Hammons states; "this $550,000 is exclusive of the 
original $250,000 for interest in the deep test and a note in 
favor of Mingo Oil in the amount of $250,000. In principal this 
represents our mutual agreement. . ." In addition, Hammons 
testified repeatedly that when the decision to acquire a 40% 
interest in Mingo 13-13 was made by him and his brother, they 
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had not decided if they would make the investment as their names 
of the name of the wholly owned corporation. (Transcript p. 
Ill, lines 4-9). 
The record reflects evidence in contradiction to the 
trial court's conclusion that the Hammons brothers did not 
individually obligate themselves in relation to the investment 
and the promise to pay $250,000. Therefore the court's ruling 
is clearly erroneous and constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court heard the testimony of the principal 
witnesses concerning various transactions. The admissions of 
the sole witness called by the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
established that those parties loaned $100,000 to Plaintiff Mike 
Strand and following his default under the terms of a promissory 
note evidencing that indebtedness entered into an agreement to 
convert that debt into an investment in an oil well. In 
addition to the conversion of the original debt the Defendants 
agreed to pay Plaintiffs an additional $150,000 cash and issue a 
$250,000 promissory note to acquire a 40% interest in that well. 
That agreement which was entered into by the parties 
and partially performed was a valid enforceable agreement which 
constituted an accord and satisfaction of the original 
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obligation. The payment of the additional $150,000 pursuant to 
the investment decision can not constitute consideration for the 
Promissory Note signed by Mingo Oil Producers. The trial 
court's conclusion of law to the contrary must be reversed upon 
Appeal. 
The testimony of Defendant W. David Hammons established 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he and his brother 
individually accepted the investment offer presented by 
Plaintiffs and are bound there under to pay Plaintiffs 
$250,000. The trial courts failure to accept the admissions of 
that witness and rule on the question of whether or not that 
obligation was conditional requires that the Plaintiffs case be 
remedied for a new trial. 
Dated this f^U day of June, 1987. 
Daniel W. Jackson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fftfi day of June, 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following individual: 
John C, Green 
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
AAJM/ms 
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JOHN C. Green 
Attorney for Defendants 
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
MICHAEL STRAND, LOIS STRAND 
and MINGO OIL COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID HAMMONS, THE ESTATE OF 
HERB HAMMONS, (Deceased), and 
ELECTRO TECHNICAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ELECTRO TECHNICAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MINGO OIL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, and MICHAEL 
STRAND, 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-8686 
aJudge Judith M. Billings 
Civil No. C-83-3934 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly 
for trial before The Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court, on the 30th day of July, 1986. 
Plaintiff Michael Strand was present with his attorney 
Daniel W. Jackson. The defendant W. David Hammons was 
present and he together with all defendants were represented 
by attorney John C. Green. The Court then heard the 
testimony of the witnesses on plaintiffs1 Compliant and 
defendants1 attorney having made a motion to dismiss at 
the close of plaintiffs1 case in chief, and the Court having 
first found that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden 
with reference to any liability on the part of defendants, 
W. David Hammons .and the Estate of Herb Hammons, and having 
further found that there was no meeting of the minds as 
between defendant, Electro Technical Corporation, and the 
plaintiffs relative to a note or an agreement by defendants 
to pay plaintiffs the sum of $250,000.00. The Court then 
concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to Judgment 
against any of the defendants. 
The Court then heard the testimony on defendants1 
Counterclaims and having found that the defendant, Electro 
Technical Corporation, has maintained two Promissory Notes 
in its possession. The first one was defendants1 Exhibit 
"1," was executed on December 1, 1981, for the benefit 
of Electro Technical Corporation and was executed by Mr. 
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Michael Strand. The Court finds this Note to be clear 
on its face, that the Note was executed in exchange for 
$100,000.00 in cash, which was given by an officer of Electro 
Technical Corporation for the benefit of Mingo Oil 
Corporation, a partnership of Mr. Strand's. The Court 
finds that there was no accord and satisfaction on said 
Note even if such oral agreements were not barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The Court finds that a second Promissory Note was 
executed by Mike Strand, President of Mingo Oil Company, 
and by Mike Strand, a General Partner of M&L Investments. 
The Court further finds the Note to be clear on its face 
and finds that Electro Technical Corporation gave $150,000 
in cash as consideration for this Promissory Note, that 
even though the total of $250,000 was not given for the 
Note, that was the bargain struck between the parties, 
therefore, the defendant and counterclaim plaintiff, Electro 
Technical Corporation, is entitled to Judgment on both 
Notes, together with interest from the date of execution, 
costs of Court and attorney!s fees. The Court having heard 
the proffer of counsel John Green relative to the rates 
charged and counsel Daniel Jackson having stipulated to 
the reasonableness of the rates. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
A. Counterclaim plaintiff, Electro Technical 
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Corporation, be, and it is hereby, entitled to Judgment 
against Michael Strand as follows: 
PRINCIPAL: 
INTEREST TO JULY 30, 1986 
COSTS: 
ATTORNEYS FEES: 
TOTAL: 
$100,000.00 
$ 91,550.00 
$ 7.50 
$ 1,651.50 
$193,209.00 
Together with after accruing costs and interest at a rate 
of 20% per annum. 
B. Counterclaim plaintiff, Electro Technical 
Corporation, be, and it is hereby, granted Judgment against 
Mingo Oil Company and M&L Investments, jointly and severally 
as follows: 
PRINCIPAL: 
INTEREST TO JULY 30, 198 6 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
COSTS: 
TOTAL: 
$250,000.00 
$112,450.00 / 
$ 2,477.25 
$ 7.50 
$364,934.75 
Together with after accruing costs and interest at a rate 
of 12% per annum. 
DATED this day of August, 1986 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Judgment to the following attorneys for plaintiffs, 
on this 11th day of August, 1986, addressed as follows: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson 
Jackson & Wilkinson 
Attorney at Law 
40 East South Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
December 30, 1981 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
For value received, MINGO OIL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, promises to pay to the order of ELECTRO TECHNI-
CAL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, at 2072 West 2300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
and No/100 ($250,000.00) on January 9, 1982. 
In the event of any default, MINGO OIL COMPANY agrees 
to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorneys' fees, legal 
expenses and lawful collection costs. 
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and 
extension of time without notice are hereby waived. 
MINGO OIL COMPANY 
By. ?**LV% J^^C 
Mike Strand 
President 
Guaranteed by: 
M & L INVESTMENTS 
a Utah partnership 
7^^f^r=^r By 
Mike Strand 
A General Partner 
Whereas Mike and Lois Strand, the owners of Mingo Oil Company are in need of 
financial assistance to clear up debts on and develop Mingo Oilfs interest in 
the Over land Dome Field and whereas David Hammonds and Herb Hammonds have access 
to the approximate sum of $550,000 deemed necessary to expedite such development 
and clear outstanding obligations, Mike and Lois Strand, et, ai, being the biggest 
creditors on the Overland Dome Field and also owners of all the production equip-
ment on said field, the debts to Mike and Lois Strand, et al, amounting to the 
Sum of $6.!' million and the value of the equipment being $i.2 million for a total 
of $9.4 million, feel it is in their best interest and the interest of said 
development to reduce the total amount of i he above figure by 50% and either 
reorganize the existing company of Mingo Oil or organize a new company under the 
Wyoming law with a equal division both to the Strands and to the Hammonds for 
their contribution of $550,000 and the reduction of the liabilities and values 
of the equipment by 50% to $4.7 million. This $4.7 million will be carried 
as a liability against the new organization as will the $550,000 contributed by 
the Hammonds. This $550,000 is exclusive of the original $250,000 for interest 
in the deep test and a note in favor of Mingo Oil in the amount of $250,000. 
In principal this represents our mutual agreement, the details and formal 
documents are to be commenced by Nick Murdock, Mingo's Wyoming counsel, as 
soon as possible. 
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